interesting finding by the flashbots team. "spam" txs are taking all our throughput gains! the article outlines two parts to the solution: the first can be solved by TEE, while the second necessitates @poddotnetwork! to solve the spam problem, we need: 1. open but restricted access to the real-time state and transaction flow = programmable privacy using TEE 2. efficient markets for tx inclusion and ordering = fast auctions on pod finding the MEV searchers spam the network trying to find potential MEV opportunities on the L2. With open but restricted access to the state and tx flow, searchers can identify MEV opportunities without simulating trades on-chain. this can be done using TEEs, where searchers can run a specific program in a restricted fashion without leaking private data - aka programmable privacy. explicit bidding once a searcher successfully identifies MEV opportunities, they need to get their transaction included. Without additional infrastructure, they would spam the network with increasingly higher tips—leading back to the same problem. this requires an efficient off-chain market where searchers can explicitly compete for inclusion and ordering. the most straightforward solution is a fast auction system where the highest bidder gets their transaction included. this is where pod comes in—pod can be leveraged to build sub-second auctions with strong censorship resistance. the combination of programmable privacy through TEE and explicit bidding on pod will enable L2s to reach their true throughput potential.
@bertcmiller ⚡️🤖
@bertcmiller ⚡️🤖17.6.2025
Today, we introduce a new thesis: MEV has become the dominant limit to scaling blockchains. Spectacularly wasteful onchain searching is starting to consume most of the capacity of most high-throughput blockchains. This is a market failure we can no longer ignore.
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