Ecuador registered 126,181 births in Jan-July 2025, 6% fewer than last year. The TFR this year will end up at around 1.50 children per woman.

It‘s crazy how high emigration of NZ citizens from New Zealand is now: in the year ending June 2025, NZ lost 46,498 citizens, a rate that rivals most Eastern European countries. Meanwhile there was a gain of 60,199 foreigners, mostly from South Asia, China and the Philippines.

Based on Q1 and Q2 2025 births in Singapore, here are the TFRs by ethnicity for 2025 (2024 in brackets): Singapore 0.91 (0.97) Chinese 0.76 (0.83) Malays 1.55 (1.58) Indians 0.84 (0.91)

Based on Q1 and Q2 2025 births in Malaysia, here are the TFRs by ethnicity for 2025 (2024 in brackets): Malaysia 1.43 (1.60) Bumiputera 1.73 (1.92) Chinese 0.75 (0.92) Indians 1.04 (1.13)

Total fertility rate, Perú, by department 2024.

Fertility Rate of DR Congo from 2021-2024. Overall, the fertility rate was 5.5. The lowest fertility rate was in Kinshasa at 3.4. The highest was in Lualaba and Maniema provinces at 7.6.

It is well understood that different fertility rates lead to changes in demographic structures within a country. These differences may be regional (e.g., region A having higher fertility than region B), ethnic, religious, cultural, or political. What is less appreciated is that, in environments with low fertility, those changes can be particularly fast. And these changes are followed by political transformations. Imagine that you have a country with groups A and B, each with 50% of the population: 1️⃣ When fertility is high, the total fertility rate (TFR) of group A is 4, and the TFR of group B is 3. Then, group A will be 62.5% of the next generation and group B 37.5%. 2️⃣ When fertility is low, the total fertility rate (TFR) of group A is 2, and the TFR of group B is 1. Then, group A will be 66.7% of the next generation and group B 33.3%. While a difference of 4.2% might not look large, it compounds over generations. Also, these are not made-up numbers but correspond roughly to the TFR of religious vs. secular families in many Western countries a few generations ago and today. Of course, there are many additional factors at work: immigration, switches among groups, intermarriages, etc. Let me give you a concrete example. Northern Ireland was created in 1921 to ensure an enclave in Ireland with a Protestant majority. The first census in Northern Ireland, in 1926, recorded Catholics at 33.5% of the population, while Protestants made up 66.3% (in the post, I will use “Catholic” and “Protestant” in the sense of a cultural community, not in the sense of active religious participation; this is how society largely worked and still works in Northern Ireland). During the next few decades, a slightly higher Catholic TFR was compensated by more Catholic emigration. In 1971, at the peak of the “Troubles”, the Catholic population was 31.4%, even lower than in 1926. The idea of a “Protestant enclave” seemed to have worked from the perspective of the unionists. However, as TFR started falling in both communities but faster among Protestants, the composition of Northern Ireland evolved quickly after 1971. In the 1991 census, the Catholic population rebounded to 38.4%, and in the 2001 census, it reached 40.3%. The next two decades accelerated the process: as secularization advanced, many people from Protestant backgrounds ceased self-identifying as such, and there was positive immigration of persons who self-identified as Catholic. In the 2021 Census, for the first time, the Catholic population reached 45.7% and surpassed the Protestant (and other Christian denominations) population, 43.5% from Protestant or other Christian backgrounds (with 17.4% declaring no religion). The idea of a “Protestant enclave” no longer seems to work from the perspective of the unionists. Why? Because political power follows demographics. A look at the constituency map of Northern Ireland demonstrates how, during the last two decades, one constituency after another controlled by Unionist parties has flipped to Republican parties. In class, I show an interesting slide deck to document this carefully (yes, I know too much about constituency politics in Northern Ireland). 1️⃣ In 1998, in the first election to the Northern Ireland Assembly after the Good Friday Agreement, Unionist parties gained 58 out of 108 seats (a majority), Republican parties 42 seats, and cross-community parties 8 seats. 2️⃣ In 2022, in the last election, Unionist candidates (including two independents) gained 37 out of 90 seats (a slim plurality), Republican parties 35 seats, and cross-community parties 18 seats. The slim Unionist plurality is only a consequence of Protestants still being a majority among older generations (with higher voting participation) and incumbents’ advantage. As time passes and both mechanisms dissipate, Republican parties will gain a plurality unless cross-community parties make enough inroads among Catholic voters. But the bottom line is that the First Minister of Northern Ireland is Michelle O’Neill, a Catholic Republican from Sinn Féin. In 1970, even with fair election rules (which largely did not exist at the time), this would have been inconceivable because O’Neill’s voters did not exist: they had not been born.

TFR of Seoul Metropolitan Area (2024, provisional)

Below-replacement fertility can have very different outcomes. With a TFR of about 1 (as in China or Malta), the third generation is only one-quarter the size of the first. With a TFR of about 1.7 (as in Bulgaria or Romania), it is three-quarters the size. #demography #fertility #population

2023-TR-Roma-DHS indicates Roma TFR in Turkey is 2.79, 1.1 higher than the overall.